This paper presents estimates of the economic benefit of air quality improvements in Europe that occur as a side effect of GHG emission reductions. We consider three climate policy scenarios that reach radiative forcing levels in 2100 of three Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs). These targets are achieved by introducing a global uniform tax on all GHG emissions in the Integrated Assessment Model WITCH, assuming both full as well as limited technological flexibility. The resulting consumption patterns of fossil fuels are used to estimate the physical impacts and the economic benefits of pollution reductions on human health and on key assets by implementing the most advanced version of the ExternE methodology with its Impact Pathway Analysis. We find that the mitigation scenario compatible with +2°C reduces total pollution costs in Europe by 76%. Discounted ancillary benefits are more than €2.5 trillion between 2015 and 2100. The monetary value of reduced pollution is equal to €22 per abated ton of CO2 in Europe. Less strict climate policy scenarios generate overall smaller, but still considerable, local benefits (14 € or 18 € per abated ton of CO2). Without discounting, the ancillary benefits are in a range of €36 to €50 per ton of CO2 abated. Cumulative ancillary benefits exceed the cumulative additional cost of electricity generation in Europe. Each European country alone would be better off if the mitigation policy was implemented, although the local benefits in absolute terms vary significantly across the countries. We can identify the relative losers and winners of ancillary benefits in Europe. In particular, we find that large European countries contribute to as much as they benefit from ancillary benefits. The scenarios with limited technology flexibility do deliver results that are similar to the full technology flexibility scenario. 
Introduction
There is wide consensus on the need to regulate Greenhouse gases emissions (GHG) to limit the adverse impact of climate change. Hardly any country in the world disputes that the current pattern of GHG emissions is unsustainable. However, there is wide disagreement on the magnitude of the optimal emission reductions, on the distribution of effort across countries, and on the timing of the emission reductions. This is hardly a surprise: the climate problem is a perfect example of intragenerational and inter-generational externality. Emission abatement costs are local, while the benefits of controlling the increase of GHG concentrations are global and will be experienced only far in the future.
Current carbon taxes and permit trading programs cover only around 12 percent of global emissions (Parry 2014) and current policies are still far from being effective and optimal (see, for instance, Máca et al. 2012; Somanathan et al. 2014) . It is unclear if future negotiations will be able to change this dismal state of climate policy. The chances are that if any agreement can be reached, it will entail a low level of commitment (Barret and Stavins 2003) .
Some authors suggest that one way to kick-start climate policy is to think locally instead of globally.
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They notice that climate mitigation policy may have immediate and local co-benefits that could partially or totally offset the cost of reducing GHG emissions. The question then becomes: "what scale of CO 2 pricing is in countries' own interest" (Parry et al. 2014 ).
For example, investment in low-emission technologies may spur innovation and growth in markets with unemployment and knowledge externalities (Bauer et al. 2009; Acemoglu et al. 2012; OECD 2012a) . Carbon taxes or revenues from auctioning emission allowances may reduce distortions in the tax system if appropriately managed (Pearce 1991; Goulder 1995; Carraro et al. 1996; Bovenberg 1999) .
As a large fraction of GHG emissions comes from the combustion of fossil fuels, the use of oil, natural gas and coal must be substantially reduced to meet any long-term climate mitigation goal. Fossil fuels also cause local and present environmental damage because, if burnt, they release pollutants that negatively affect human health, ecosystems and other assets. Climate mitigation policies would thus reduce the burden of ground-level air pollution. The reduction of fossil fuels consumption and the shift of the energy mix away from coal -the most polluting among the fossil fuels -to natural gas is expected to reduce the concentrations of particulate matters, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, ozone precursors (NO X and VOC) and other toxic pollutants. Climate change mitigation can thus generate immediate ancillary benefits 2 by reducing the negative impacts of pollution on human health, crop yields, building materials or ecosystems.
The aim of this paper is to provide estimates of local air quality ancillary benefits of carbon taxes in Europe. We assume that the carbon price is exogenously set to achieve the most recent set of climate mitigation targets used in the literature 3 and we estimate the air-quality benefits of such climate policies. We argue that these benefits should be kept logically distinct from the benefits of climate mitigation. Our goal is to estimate the size of local air quality externalities compared to the global carbon price. We also estimate the value of ancillary benefits per ton of GHG emission abated and per Euro of abatement costs in the power sector in Europe.
In order to assess the local environmental benefits of climate policy we use the integrated assessment model WITCH to provide fossil fuel use in the power sector under alternative carbon tax scenarios and an impact pathway analysis embedded in the ExternE method (EC 2005) to estimate the economic damage of emissions of particulate matters or various fractions (PM10, PM2.5), sulphur dioxide (SO 2 ), nitrogen oxides (NO X ), non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOCs), and heavy metals (As, Cd, Cr, Hg, Ni, Pb) . Although our economic model is global, we consider the ancillary benefits for Europe and the abatement costs involved for the electricity sector in Europe. Despite recent efforts to increase the level of renewable electricity generation, coal fired power plants still provide about 25% of total electricity generation in Europe. Coal is the fossil fuel that causes the largest local and global environmental damage. Any effort to reduce GHGs emissions will also yield large local environmental benefits in Europe.
Overall the strengths of our approach are: (1) cost effective energy and emissions scenarios that deliver the most recent climate mitigation targets; (2) the use of atmospheric circulation models to track the impact of air pollution using; (3) the ability to estimate EU-wide and country-level ancillary benefits; (4) the inclusion of Eastern European countries, typically not considered by European studies; (5) the possibility to separate the ancillary benefits between those caused by reduction in local energy use and those due to emissions reductions elsewhere.
In the RCP2.6 mitigation scenario -a +2°C compatible scenario -we find that discounted total ancillary benefits for Europe are greater than €2.5T, or about €21.6 per abated ton of CO 2 . Less strict climate policy scenarios generate overall smaller local benefits, but the magnitude of ancillary benefits per abated ton of CO 2 is still considerable (€14.4, or €18.3, respectively) than under stricter mitigation. Without discounting, the ancillary benefits are in a range of €36 to €50 per ton of CO 2 abated. Over the whole century ancillary benefits per abated ton of CO 2 are 7-times larger than the carbon price in the less aggressive climate scenario and only 0.06 of the carbon price that has quite large value in the RCP2.6 mitigation scenario. Ancillary benefits cumulated over the century exceed cumulative additional cost of electricity generation in Europe in both strict mitigation scenarios. About 73% of total ancillary benefits attributable to the RCP4.5 mitigation scenario have domestic origin, while the rest of benefits is enjoyed in other countries than in a country where the emissions are abated. There are relative losers and winners with respect to produced and received ancillary benefits. However, there is no country in Europe that will be worse-off if the mitigation policy was implemented. Scenarios with technological constraints do not lead to qualitatively different results.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on the ancillary benefits, while Section 3 describes the integrated assessment model, the impact pathway analysis, and the linkages between the two approaches. Section 4 describes climate policy scenarios and energy use in Europe. Section 5 presents estimates of the side benefits of climate policy. Conclusions follow.
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Literature Review
The ancillary benefits of GHG mitigation policies have been investigated in a variety of empirical studies. The literature has used a wide range of techniques and models, it has covered different geographic areas, pollutants and pollution-related impacts. Some studies rely on air quality modelling while others use default damage factors per pollutant. 4 Due to these differences, results from these studies are difficult to compare.
Among the studies that analyze the effect of a policy on multiple pollutants, a first distinction can be made between studies that focus on physical impacts (e.g. Meyer et al. 1998) and studies that emphasize the monetization of the impacts (e.g. Burtraw et al. 2003) . Several studies investigated the links between regional air pollution and climate policy in Europe (Syri et al. 2001; Alcamo et al. 2002; van Harmelen et al. 2002) . Most, if not all, studies on ancillary benefits either utilize a damage factor for each pollutant or connect emissions to changes in concentrations, human exposures, physical effects and monetary damages using an integrated assessment model, such as the US APEEP (Muller and Mendelsohn 2007) or the EU ExternE's impact pathway analysis (Holland et al. 2011) .
Regarding the economic modelling, the ancillary benefits are quantified (a) relying on a linear programming partial equilibrium energy model (e.g., Burtraw et al. 2003; Van Vuuren et al. 2006; Riekkola et al. 2011; Holland et al. 2011; Rečka and Ščasný 2013 ) that can be further enriched, for instance, by econometric estimates of abatement costs (Burtraw et al. 2014) , or (b) using a computable general equilibrium model (e.g., Glomsrød et al. 1992; Scheraga and Leary 1993; Paltsev et al. 2005; Grossman et al. 2011; Nam et al. 2013; Kiuila et al. forthcoming) . Bollen et al. (2009) use the MERGE model, a top-down optimization model with a good energy sector detail. MERGE is the model used in the ancillary benefits literature that is most similar to WITCH. There are however several differences between our study and Bollen at al. (2009) . First, we are concerned with the estimation of ancillary benefits rather than the joint optimal determination of local pollution abatement and global GHG emissions reduction. Second we consider the most recent scenarios in the climate change literature and we provide information on ancillary benefits associated to each scenario. Third, while Bollen et al. (2009) only consider PM pollution, we include a much larger set of pollutants in our analysis. Fourth, we do not have a hard-linked air pollution impact module, which is a weakness, but the flexibility of a soft-link approach allows us to use a more complicated modelling approach that takes into account the atmospheric circulation of local pollutants. Finally, Bollen et al. (2009) deal with global costs and benefits while we provide EU-level and country-level analysis.
The range of estimates of air-quality ancillary benefits is large and depends on many factors, including climate policy scenario, modelling assumptions and the time period over which the benefits are calculated. In their review of the literature Davis et al. (2000) report a range from €0.6 to €78 (Dessus and O'Connor 1999) and €148 (Aunan et al. 2000) per ton of reduced CO 2 emissions.
5 A review of 48 peer reviewed studies by Nemet et al. (2010) provides a range of the air quality cobenefits of climate change mitigation from €1.6 to €152 per ton of abated CO 2 with a mean of €38/tCO 2 . Focusing on the co-benefits from mitigation in the US electricity sector, Nemet et al. provide a range of estimates ranging from €3 to €90, and found larger ancillary benefit estimates for 5 developing countries (with a mean of €62) than for the developed countries (mean €33). Parry et al. (2014) derive 'nationally efficient carbon prices' that reflect domestic non-internalized environmental benefits for top 20 emitters of GHG emissions. The efficient prices reflect primarily health co-benefits from reduced air pollution at coal plants and reductions in automobile externalities, which are net of fuel taxes or subsidies. They find that the cross-country average of nationally efficient prices is equal to €44 per ton of CO 2 in 2010 (with a range between €22 to €66 per ton as the damage values are reduced and increased by 50 percent). These prices substantially vary, however, across countries; the nationally efficient CO 2 price is as high as €224 per ton in Saudi Arabia, €48 per ton in China, or €28 in the United States. Brazil on average overcorrects for cobenefits through pre-existing policies that results in the negative efficient price of -€18. Coal air pollution damage is estimated for the top twenty emitters at €66 per ton. It is important to note that Parry et al. (2014) do not consider any benefit from reduced global warming when they calculate the 'nationally efficient carbon price'. They calculate the value of the ancillary benefit of a carbon tax and find the level at which the tax is equal to the local benefits.
For the EU, Holland et al. (2011) estimate that the 2˚C stabilization scenario would reduce SO 2 emissions by 60%, NOx emissions by 46% and particulate matters by 19% using the partial equilibrium energy model GAINS. These emission reductions would lead to large health improvements and important co-benefits in ecosystems. The air quality co-benefits are estimated at €43B per year by 2050 in the EU27, which corresponds to about €24 per ton of CO 2 . Markandya et al. (2009) obtained similar results for the EU, but much greater co-benefits in fast growing countries such as China and India. Barker and Rosendhal (2000) estimate the co-benefits from SO 2 , NOx and PM10 reduction as an effect of carbon tax for Western Europe at €41 per ton of CO 2 abated.
While the literature on ancillary benefits has considerably grown during the past twenty years, studies aiming at developing countries or transforming economies in Eastern Europe are relatively few (Morgenstern 2000). Aaheim et al. (1997) and Aunan et al. (2000) investigated the ancillary benefits of several policies, covering energy efficiency or public transport, in Hungary. They estimated annual health benefits in a range of $370 to $1,168m. Dudek et al. (2003) provide an analysis of ancillary benefits of energy market reforms and emission trading for Russia and observe 30,000 to 40,000 lives saved that are then monetized using the Value of Statistical Life (VSL). Using a linear optimization energy model linked to ExternE's impact pathway analysis, Rečka and Ščasný (2013) estimated the ancillary benefits of the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) in the Czech power sector at €3,100B during 2006-2030, or €4,100B if no new nuclear plant is allowed. These results imply the ancillary benefits of €15 per ton of CO 2 in both scenarios. Using same approach, Ščasný and Rečka (forthcoming) obtained the ancillary benefits for tightening CO 2 target in Slovakia at €11 per ton of CO 2 . Kiuilia et al. (forthcoming) estimated co-benefits of full internalization of external costs attributable to local pollutants in the Czech Republic by CGE model in a range of €32 to €72, depending on the scenario and taxed sectors. The ancillary benefit estimates are summarized in Table A The model is defined as hybrid because it features an aggregated top-down Ramsey-type optimal growth model combined with a detailed description of the energy sector. The aggregated economic model is structured according to a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) framework where the two macro-inputs, capital and labour, are combined with energy to produce the final output. The energy node is then disaggregated in a detailed, fully integrated, bottom-up section that features all major power technologies and non-electric energy demand aggregated by fuel. The model is able to study the evolution of the energy sector in relationship with major economic and climate variables.
Technical change is endogenous in WITCH and is modelled via Learning-by-Researching (LbR) and Learning-by-Doing (LbD) effects. LbR determines technology cost reduction by means of dedicated investments in R&D capital. International R&D spillovers are also taken into account. LbD reduces the investment cost of renewable and backstop energy technologies as a consequence of progressive deployment of the technology. A more detailed description of the model can be found in Bosetti et al. (2006 Bosetti et al. ( 2007 Bosetti et al. ( and 2009 ).
The ExternE method
We estimate the impact of climate change mitigation on air quality using a method based on the most recent ExternE (Externalities of Energy) 7 Impact Pathway Analysis (IPA). 8 The IPA is an analytical procedure examining the sequence of processes through which polluting emissions result into external damages. The method allows to estimate the marginal physical impact and the marginal cost of pollution from each power plant (in general from any emission source), as a function of the technology and of the location of the plant.
The IPA comprises four basic steps: (i) selection of the reference power plant, determination of the technology used and of the harmful emissions released, (ii) calculation of changes in pollutant concentration for all affected regions using atmospheric dispersion models, (iii) estimation of 6 For the purposes of this work, the European Union is given by the sum of WEURO (Western Europe) and EEURO (Eastern Europe), although this is not rigorously correct due to the presence of the EFTA countries in the EU. 7 The European Commission in collaboration with the US Department of Energy launched a joint research projects to assess the energy-related externalities in 1991 (European Commission 1995; ORNL and RFF 1995) . Following a detailed bottom-up methodology relying on impact pathway approach, the EU/US studies provided estimates of marginal external costs of electricity production from a wide range of energy technologies at various locations. The EC provided additional funding over the years to improve the ExternE accounting framework and to expand it to new EU member states and to other non-EU countries. The ExternE IPA framework that we use has been recently updated within the NEEDS project (http://www.needs-project.org/). For more information on ExternE see http://www.externe.info. Weinzettell et al. (2012) apply the ExternE method to quantify production and consumption related externalities of power sector in Europe.7 physical impacts from exposure using concentration-response functions (CFRs), and (iv) economic valuation of impacts using direct costs (effect on crop yield, damage on building materials or biodiversity) or compensating/equivalent surplus measured through the willingness-to-pay approach. The ExternE's IPA method is very similar to an integrated assessment model used in the American studies to connect emissions to changes in concentrations, human exposures, physical effects and monetary damages by the Air Pollution Emission Experiments and Policy model (APEEP, see Mendelsohn 2007, 2009; Muller et al. 2011; Grossman et al. 2011 ).
The IPA procedure has been incorporated into EcoSense, the integrated atmospheric dispersion and exposure assessment model that we use for our analysis.
9 EcoSense uses air transport models to control changes in the atmospheric concentration of pollutants at local, regional and global level.
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The model then determines a range of impacts on human health, buildings, biodiversity, and crop yields using concentration-response functions. We evaluate the economic impact of micro-pollutants using generic estimates of marginal costs -i.e. the same damage value regardless which country releases the micro-pollutant -as estimated in the ExternE project series. The loss of ecosystems is assessed using a measure of Potential Disappeared Fraction of species (Frischnecht and Steiner 2006) linked to acidification and eutrophication. We use appropriate concentration-response functions to estimate the economic loss from mortality and morbidity, from agricultural productivity losses and for damages to building materials. Valuation methods of welfare economics are used to translate the physical impacts into monetary impacts.
Impacts on human health, mainly on mortality, are the most important among all impacts. In order to establish a causal relationship between pollution and human morbidity and mortality, ExternE uses concentration-response functions calibrated using a large number of epidemiological and toxicological studies. At the beginning of the ExternE project the CRFs of all European countries were calibrated using studies for the United States. The European functions have now been re-calibrated using epidemiological and toxicological studies for Europe. The economic loss due to increased mortality is estimated using the Value of Life Year (VOLY) (Desaigues' et al. 2011) , reflecting recent changes in the ExternE methodology. Previously, ExternE used a uniform Value of Statistical Life (VSL) to value excess mortality. Several studies have argued that the VSL is appropriate to value large losses of life expectancy from fatal accidents but it should not be used to estimate the usually smaller impact of pollution on life expectancy, especially of elderlies (Rabl et al. 2014) . Regardless which one of the two metrics is used, they should be both based on the willingness to pay for a small reduction in risk of dying (Hammitt 2007) .
In this study, following the ExternE method, the VOLY for chronic mortality is set at €40,000, the recommended value of ExternE for cost-benefit analyses of EU-level policies. 11 9 http://ecosenseweb.ier.uni-stuttgart.de/ 10 EcoSense uses three models of air quality: (i) the Industrial Source Complex Model for transport of primary air pollutants on a local scale delaminated by 100 x 100 km around the power plant, (ii) the EMEP/MSC-West Eulerian dispersion model for modelling transport and chemical transformation of primary pollutants on a regional scale covering all Europe, and (iii) the N-Hemispheric Model which served for estimation of the intercontinental influence primary and secondary pollutants (secondary inorganic aerosols, tropospheric ozone). 11 The recommended value of so called chronic VOLY is based on the mean estimate of the willingness to pay for changing life expectancy by two months using data from a pooled sample of nine European countries. Data is adjusted using a simple benefit transfer technique to correct for the differences in income and population in EU Member States. Monetary values for work loss day, medical costs, or the willingness to pay to avoid illnesses also reflect EU-wide averages.
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The valuation of morbidity is by no means trivial. Morbidity increases medical costs and causes a loss of productivity, but it also causes large, harder to measure, disutility from pain and suffering. There has been recent interest in assessing the value of utility losses from illness, but more research is needed, especially to value the damages from chronic illness (e.g. chronic bronchitis or asthma symptoms). We follow here the valuation of additional morbidity proposed in the NEEDS update of ExternE. Their values range from €1 for each use of bronchodilator to €200,000 per new case of chronic bronchitis.
Crop losses are valued at the international market prices. The impacts on building materials are assessed using replacement and maintenance costs, the assessment of biodiversity impacts is based on restoration costs.
We use country-specific impacts valued by EU-wide social damage costs to express them in €2005 per ton of emission of pollutant as estimated by the project NEEDS. We include the most common air pollutants (SO 2 , NOx, PM 2.5 , PM 10 , NMVOC) and heavy metals (As, Cd, Cr, Hg, Ni, Pb). NEEDS provides the average value of external costs per ton of emission for a total of 39 European and non-European countries.
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The marginal social cost of emissions of heavy metals is developed in NEEDS using data from the EUfunded project ESPREME (2007) and from two studies (Fantke 2008; Spadaro and Rabl 2007) . Since the background concentration of NO X , SO 2 , NMVOC and NH 3 influences the generation of secondary pollutants -e.g. ozone, sulphates, nitrates -the NEEDS project provides two sets of impact estimates for non-metals: one in 2010 and the other in 2020 (see, Preiss and Klotz 2008) . The EU-wide average external cost of pollution is reported in As an example, Figure 1 presents the EU-wide impacts of one additional unit of PM 2.5 released in any EU country, in 2010 and in 2020. The figure also displays the EU average marginal cost of PM 2.5 . The marginal cost of pollution in Figure 1 is the EU-wide social cost of pollution. The social cost differs across countries because of different environmental conditions, different density of receptors, and different characteristics of the receptors. For instance, the unit damage cost of PM 2.5 is much smaller (about 4,000 € per ton) in countries with lower population density in their neighbouring countries (Finland, Norway, or Sweden) than in countries (Benelux, Germany) at the centre of a heavily populated region (about 20,000 € per ton).
The cost of pollution for Europe is equal to the sum of the cost attributable to fuel use and hence emissions released from their burning in each of the 28 European countries. The released emissions 9 have an effect on receptors (humans, species, assets) in the 28 European countries but they also affect emission receptors in the rest of the world. Using the EcoSenseWeb tool, we derive the cost of one additional unit of pollution released in country i that is inflicted to each of the remaining European countries j and to the rest of the world (j+1). In our case, this procedure generates 28 x 29 pollution costs. We assume that the distribution of impacts due to emissions releases from country i, i.e. regional increase in ambient concentrations, remains same over the whole period 2015-2100 as in the reference year. In other words, we do not model meteorological conditions and transport of pollutants over time.
Source: Preiss and Klotz (2008) . 
Linking the WITCH model and the ExternE approach
The ancillary benefits of reducing GHG emissions are derived using data on fossil fuels consumption for power generation (EN) from WITCH. WITCH provides energy scenarios for Eastern and Western Europe until 2100. In order to provide country-level scenarios of fossil fuels combustion for power generation (EN f,j ) we assume that the current distribution of power generation across countries remains unchanged. 13 Emission factors (EF) from fossil fuels used for power generation are from the EMEP EEA air pollutant emission inventory guidebook (EMEP/EEA, 2013) and are listed in Table A There are five channels through which both GHG and air quality emissions can be reduced: (1) reducing total economic output (scale effect), (2) restructuring the economy towards less emissionintensive sectors (composition effect), (3) reducing the fuel intensity of production (fuel intensity effect), (4) using fuels with reduced or no carbon emissions (fuel mix effect), and (5) utilizing more efficient end-of-pipe technologies (emission-fuel intensity effect). 14 By linking WITCH and IPA we are able to take into account channel (1); channel (2) is also accounted for, but it cannot be separated from (3) because WITCH has only one aggregate final good sector; the mix of the capital-labour aggregate with energy is instead optimally determined in WITCH; channels (4) and (5) are also accounted for.
The change of the fuel mix responds to changes in the cost of fuels and of power generation capital and to the carbon tax penalty. However, WITCH does not track non-GHG emissions. 15 As the non-GHG emission factors for fuels (EF f ) remain constant over the entire period, it implies time invariant efficacy of the end-of-pipe abatement technologies and hence constant emissions per unit of fuel over time.
As noted above, in ExternE the willingness to pay used to derive the damage factors reflects EU average values, implicitly assuming that all Europeans share the same preference for avoiding adverse health and other negative impacts.
The real value of pollution costs (PC) attributable to air polluting emissions released by country i in year t is derived as follows:
where f denotes the fuel type (coal, gas, oil, biomass, nuclear, renewable energy), p denotes the pollutant (SO 2 , NOx, PM, NMVOC, heavy metals). For each country i, the cost of air pollution is determined summing damages in each own country and on all other 'victim' countries j. We sum the damage of emissions on each other and 28 European countries plus the rest of Europe
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, including i th country, in that airborne concentrations are changed due to emissions released from the emitting country i. Thus, the first term in equation (1) ( , • ,p • , ) quantifies the external cost of non-GHG emissions released by country i. Our impact assessment follows a static approach: neither of the parameters on emission-fuel factors (EF f,p ), damage factors (DF p,j ), country's share on fuel use (sh j ), or ε y wtp are time invariant. Then, the second and the third terms adjust for the differences in income levels across 28 European countries, and over time, respectively. These adjustments are based on a simple benefit transfer that assumes that richer people are willing to pay more -not necessarily strictly proportionally -than poor people. The second term translates the EU average value into the values that are more relevant to a 'victim' country j, where Y j and Y EU are real per capita GDP in purchasing power standards in country j, or in the EU, respectively, in the year 2005. As a result we monetize physical impacts by country-specific values, instead of using an EU-average value (e.g. Holland et al. 2011) . The third term adjusts for possible changes in income over time in the 'victim' country. ε y wtp denotes the income elasticity of willingness to pay, for which we use a value equal to 0.8, similarly (OECD 2012b (OECD , 2014 WHO and OECD 2015) . 17 The parameter g p is real growth in per capita GDP, as endogenously determined by WITCH for the two European regions. No equity weighting is assumed in our calculation of pollution costs.
Several adjustments are made to ensure the comparability of monetary values and to guarantee consistency between the two modelling approaches. The WITCH model provides results in 2005 USD, while the pollution costs in the ExternE are expressed in 2000 €. All values are converted to 2005 € by using the GDP deflator and the market exchange rate for 2005. In order to compare the ancillary benefits with economic impacts expressed in present value, the ancillary benefits are discounted using the interest rate endogenously determined in WITCH. 18 We repeat this exercise for a set of climate mitigation scenarios recently developed. We follow Riekkola et al. (2011) and express the ancillary benefits as the difference between the air pollution damages in the baseline scenario and in the policy scenario. For each policy scenario we calculate the absolute benefit of pollution reduction, the benefit per ton of CO 2 emissions abated in the European electricity sector, the ratio between air pollution ancillary benefits and total CO 2 abatement cost in the electricity sector, and the benefit as a ratio of the global carbon price.
Scenarios
In this study we use four climate mitigation policy scenarios developed using WITCH for the EUfunded project GLOBAL-IQ . The Reference scenario assumes the continuation of observed trends. We assume that there is no policy to reduce GHG emissions in the Reference scenario. We then use three climate policy scenarios in which emissions decline over time to achieve three levels of radiative forcing in 2100: 6.0, 4.5 and 2.6 watts/m 2 (they correspond to concentrations equal to 850, 650, and 490 ppm CO 2 eq). These scenarios are named RCP6.0, RCP4.5 and RCP2.6 because the radiative forcing levels are those used in the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP) (Van Vuuren et al. 2011 ).
The RCPs have been recently developed to provide greenhouse gases emissions scenarios to the climate models that have been used to generate the most recent set of climate change scenarios (Stocker et al. 2013) . The RCPs are the new standard in the climate change literature and are now being complemented by a set of socio-economic scenarios, the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP) (Ebi et al. 2014 , Van Vuuren et al. 2014 . 17 The OECD (2012b) review finds that the income elasticity of the VSL is in the range of 0.7 and 0.9 in most of the regressions that use screening criteria. In other studies this range is substantially lower -about 0.3 to 0.4. Viscusi (2000) finds studies that use a value greater than unity. In most studies the income elasticity of the VSL ranges between 0 and 1 and the income elasticity of WTP around unity may be justified for the transfers between countries with heterogeneous income (Czajkowski and Ščasný 2010) . 18 In WITCH the pure rate of time preference declines over time. Each RCP scenario may be the outcome of different socioeconomic pathways. For example, a high emission scenario may be the outcome of both a fast-growing but highly efficient global economy and of a sluggish and inefficient global economy. Analogously, the same emission trajectory (RCP) may be consistent with both high and low global economic inequalities.
The Reference scenario used in this study reproduces population and economic growth of the SSP2 scenario. The SSP2 is a central-case scenario because current trends are assumed to continue indefinitely in the future. The SSP2 is commonly identified as the "Middle of the road" scenario.
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In our Reference scenario population and economic growth follow the trends observed in the past. There are considerable energy efficiency improvements in the Reference scenario, but global energy demand substantially increases as a result of economic and population growth. Without any global agreement to reduce greenhouse gases emissions this incremental energy demand is mainly covered using fossil fuels. The carbon dioxide emissions from the use of fossil fuels are the main source of additional GHGs that are released in the atmosphere in the Reference scenario. The power sector is one of the largest contributors to CO 2 emissions. In 2010 about 10 Gt CO 2 are released from power plants at global level, of which 1.4 Gt originate from Europe. This is equivalent to about 30% of total CO 2 emissions. The carbon intensity of the European power sector declines up to 2030 and then it climbs again as coal re-gains a share of the power mix. In 2050 emissions are equal to 1.1 Gt CO 2 per year (24% of European CO 2 emissions) and in 2100 emissions from the power sector total 1.7 Gt CO 2 per year (35% of European CO 2 emissions) (see Figure 2 ).
The climate module used by WITCH indicates that radiative forcing achieves 6.6 W/m 2 in 2100 in the Reference scenario. The global mean temperature increases by 4.1 °C in 2100, with respect to the pre-industrial level.
Emissions sharply decline in the RCP scenarios. While the RCP6.0 is only marginally different from the SSP2 scenario, the RCP4.5, and especially the RPC2.6 scenarios indicate that it is optimal to drastically cut emissions from power generation. Coal and natural gas power plants are retrofitted with carbon capture and storage equipment while investments in wind and solar power increase. Investments in end-use energy efficiency R&D reduce the demand of energy and of electricity in particular. As early as in 2040 emissions in the RCP2.6 scenario become negative because biomass (carbon neutral) is burnt in power plants with carbon capture and storage. Thus the power sector quickly shifts from being a major source of emissions to being a net sink. All the RCP scenarios assume full technological flexibility. For example carbon capture and sequestration is deployed on a large scale starting from 2020. Biomass is assumed to be widely available. Energy efficiency gains, although costly, greatly contribute to the reduction of electricity demand. The energy system as a whole is assumed to quickly adapt to the new regulatory regime. In order to test the effect of a less flexible technological setup on local pollution we also use three scenarios in which technological adaptation is limited (see Massetti et al. 2014 , Leimbach et al. 2014 . These are limited adaptation scenarios (LA). We calculate the new carbon price that is consistent with the RCP4.5 scenario and we assess how the technology mix and the distribution of emissions changes across technologies and across sectors (total emissions are unchanged because we still impose the long-term climate target to be achieved). Specifically, we consider three additional scenarios: with limited energy efficiency (LA-EE), limited renewable energy (LA-REN) and limited supply and trade of biomass (LA-BIO). For the limited adaptation scenarios we calculate emissions reductions and climate mitigation policy costs using a 'limited adaptation' Reference scenario with the same technology constraint as in the policy scenario. We are particularly interested in whether there is any meaningful difference in local pollution as a consequence of constraints to key mitigation technologies.
Results
Economic impacts
In all climate mitigation scenarios our policy tool is a uniform -over countries, sectors and GHG emissions -carbon tax. The time path of the carbon taxes is shown in Figure 3 . 20 The policy starts in 2015 and with the RCP6.0, RCP4.5 and RCP2.6 scenarios the global mean temperature increases by 3.7°C, 3.0 °C and 2.0°C, respectively. In the RCP6.0 case, the carbon tax starts at 3 USD/tCO 2 eq and achieves 14 USD/tCO 2 eq in 2100. The level of the tax is very low because the RCP6.0 target is not far from the Reference scenario. The carbon tax for the RCP4.5 reaches 335/tCO 2 eq USD in 2100. Due to limited technology adaptation, the level of the carbon tax is 10% higher in LA-BIO and by 31% higher in LA-EE in 2100, but it is almost identical in LA-REN. The variations of the carbon tax reflect the relative importance of alternative mitigation channels. The tax escalates in RCP2.6 and reaches more than 3,500 USD/tCO 2 eq in 2100. The tax is recycled lump-sum in each region. Nothing but the price of carbon is changed with respect to the corresponding reference scenarios.
Notes: RCP6.0 on the secondary vertical axis. As it becomes more and more expensive to emit GHG emissions, the model scenario projects investment in carbon-free technologies for the energy sector, in energy efficiency R&D, in R&D to develop carbon-free backstop technologies, it substitutes the energy input with capital and labour and it invests in a series of activities to reduce CO 2 emissions from deforestation and other non-CO 2 gases. The resulting emissions trajectories are the optimal (efficient) solution of a complex intertemporal and strategic optimization problem. Feedback from technology spillovers and from global energy markets are internalized in the solution of each regional social planner.
Emissions reductions in the power sector are the result of reduced demand due to higher efficiency and factor substitution in end uses and of decarbonization of the fuel mix. Fossils fuels without carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) are progressively phased out by nuclear, renewables, and fossil fuel power plants with CCS. When the carbon tax is high, bioenergy with CCS plays an important role. Coal power plants without CCS disappear by the end of the century in both the RCP4.5 and the RCP2.6 scenarios. The RCP2.6 scenario is so stringent that coal with CCS is also progressively phased-out because the penalty on the uncaptured emissions is very expensive. Thus climate policy also delivers local environmental benefits by greatly reducing harmful emissions released during coal combustion. Figure 4 illustrates how the power generation mix evolves over the century in the Reference and in the climate policy scenarios. Notes: costs discounted using the endogenous interest rate of the model. We note that in the limited technology scenarios we still achieve the same target for overall radiative forcing and hence for carbon concentrations of the full flexibility scenarios. The only differences between the full flexibility scenario and scenario with limited adaptation are the technology mix and the cost of the policy. Emissions from the power sector are also different, as we document below.
All the mitigation measures implemented in the tax scenarios are costly because they reduce the overall efficiency of the economy. As a result economic growth is slower in the tax scenarios and aggregated consumption and GDP decline with respect to the Reference scenario. Figure 5 shows the aggregated consumption and GDP losses from 2010 to 2100, evaluated using the endogenous interest rate calculated in WITCH. These costs are not net of the economic benefit of reduced global warming and of reduced local pollution.
Consumption and GDP losses at global level range from almost zero in the RCP6.0 scenario to about 5% and 6% in the RCP2.6 scenario, respectively. In Europe the cost of the RCP2.6 scenario is lower than at global level, and it is equal to about 2% in terms of consumption and about 3% in terms of GDP.
Impact on emissions
Each climate mitigation scenario results in a remarkable decrease in the total volume of polluting emissions, with the exception of PM 2.5 and nickel emissions ( Table 2 ). The increase in these two pollutants is a consequence of substituting fossil fuels with biomass, for which the EMEP/EEA inventory reports the highest emission factors among all fuels. As biomass is carbon neutral, it becomes a viable alternative to fossil fuels in all mitigation scenarios. In particular, the RCP2.6 scenario has a very large use of biomass with carbon capture and sequestration to compensate for emissions in other sectors. As a consequence, the RCP2.6 scenario displays the largest increase in PM 2.5 pollutants.
In the RCP4.5 scenarios with limited technological adaptation, emissions of air pollutants change, although not dramatically. The only exception is PM 2.5 when supply and trade of biomass is limited (RCP4.5-BIO). The fully flexible scenario (RCP4.5) leads to an increase of PM 2.5 emissions equal to 3,056 kt (with respect to the Reference scenario), while the constrained scenario leads to a reduction of 9 kt of PM 2.5 (with respect to the constrained Reference scenario). Annual changes in emissions of PM 2.5 and SO 2 for each climate mitigation scenarios are displayed in Figure 6 . 
Ancillary benefits in total and per ton of abated CO 2
The ancillary benefits of climate mitigation are displayed in Table 3 . The first two columns display total CO 2 emissions (CO 2 ) and total local pollution costs (PC). The third and the fourth column present the change of CO 2 emissions (∆CO 2 ) and the ancillary benefits (AB=∆PC). The fifth column displays ancillary benefits per reduced ton of CO 2 (AB/∆CO 2 ). All results are relevant to Europe only and all nominal values are expressed in present value of 2005 Euro, discounted using the endogenous interest rate from the WITCH model.
In the RCP2.6 scenario the level of CO 2 -eq concentrations is kept at 490 ppm thanks to a massive reduction of GHG emissions compared to the Reference scenario (120 Gt over the period 2015-2100). Due to this sharp reduction of GHG emissions also local pollution collapses and the discounted cost of pollution over the century drops from €3,394B to €816B (76% reduction). The ancillary benefits are higher than €2,500B, which implies an average benefit of about €21.6 per abated ton of CO 2 -eq. in Europe. The RCP4.5 generates the second largest ancillary benefits, amounting to more than €1,061B. These benefits result from 31% cumulative reduction in the pollution cost in Europe. CO 2 emissions are reduced by 73 Gt in the RCP4.5 scenario, which implies 14.4€/tCO 2 -eq of local benefits per abated. The RCP6.0 -with only 15% CO 2 -eq reduction and 9% reduction of the pollution costs -leads to one order of magnitude smaller cumulative ancillary benefits than the RCP2.6. The magnitude of the ancillary benefits per ton of CO 2 -eq avoided is, however, very similar. This result is explained by the strong similarity of the power generation mix across the three scenarios. The share of total emissions reductions from the power sector is also rather constant across scenarios. The RCP4.5 scenarios with limited adaptation have ancillary benefits that are similar to those found for the unconstrained RCP4.5 scenario. Our results are in line with other studies (see Section 2), but our study covers a longer time horizon, it considers more abatement options and more climate policy scenarios.
(1) Table 3 displays discounted ancillary benefits. Without discounting, climate mitigation yields in Europe, on average, ancillary benefits in the range of €36 (RCP4.5) to €50 (RCP6.0) per abated ton of CO 2 eq for the whole period until 2100. Ancillary benefits of the stricter mitigation (RCP2.6) are about 44 €/tCO 2 eq during 2015-2050 and after 2080 the benefits are over €50 per ton. Benefits for the RCP4.5 scenario follow an inverted U-shape form; the benefits are about 30 € per ton until 2025, then they are rising at €60 level around 2040-2044, and then they again go down reaching €27 per ton CO 2 eq in the 2080's. Under mild climate mitigation (RCP6.0), the ancillary benefits start at around €30, then they reach €50. In absolute terms, total benefits, as cumulated over the period 2015-2100, are slightly over €5,600B (RCP2.6), €2,600B in RCP4.5, and only about €800B in RCP6.0.
We then compare ancillary benefits (AB) and the total cost of electricity generation (TC), both discounted and in present values. Table 4 displays both benefits and costs as cumulated over the period that always starts from 2015 and ends in the year at the end of given period. Both are derived as a difference with respect to the corresponding Reference scenario. For the whole period 2015-2100, the ancillary benefits exceed the additional cost of electricity generation in the RCP2.6 as well as in the RCP4.5; the RCP6.0 results in cost savings.
RCP2.6 RCP4.5 RCP6.0 RCP4.5-EFFIC RCP4.5-REN RCP4. 5-BIOM   AB  TC  AB  TC  AB  TC  AB  TC  AB  TC  AB  TC   2019  237  -59  8  19  7  18  1  2  1  2  1  2  2024  440  -70  20  67  17  51  5  34  4  27  4  28  2029  637  -20  81  128  69  77  28  82  24  68  25  70  2034  833  33  187  177  142  96  77  140  68  106  69  111  2039  1,009  104  291  232  207  104  145  191  115  160  119  172  2044  1,171  180  393  277  262  105  218  181  173  214  184  219  2049  1,316  268  489  258  301  95  290  204  240  215  250  222  2059  1,584  447  652  307  357  68  430  223  369  309  378  248  2069  1,830  660  773  259  378  18  568  305  491  335  502  302 Table 5 provides a comparison between the undiscounted (real) value of ancillary benefits and the carbon price per ton of CO 2 for each climate mitigation scenario and their progress until 2100. RCP6.0 implies the lowest carbon price, from €2 to €12 per ton of CO 2 eq. We can also find that, on average for the whole period, ancillary benefits per ton of CO 2 eq are 7-times larger than the carbon price. Due to higher carbon prices in stricter climate mitigation scenarios, this ratio is only 0.5 in RCP4.5 and 0.06 in RCP2.6. Our results are however still in line with other studies; for instance Grossman et al. (2011) found the ratio of ancillary benefits on permit price in a range between 40% and 250% in 2015 (with CO 2 price at $29), and between 18% and 125% in 2030 ($61). Note: AB -cumulative ancillary benefits over the period 2015 until the end of the year shown on the respective line (for instance, 2030-39 indicates the benefits over 2015 to 2039). AB/CO 2 -average ancillary benefits per ton reduced CO 2 in given period; p/CO 2 -carbon price per ton CO 2 ; all values in real undiscounted 2005 Euro. The indicators related to CO 2 emissions are expressing average annual value for given period shown in the first column. * Starting from 2090, CO 2 emissions are slightly higher than in the SSP2 reference scenario. In 2100, RCP6.0 generates ancillary damage, instead of benefits, but they are negligible in size. pollution cost values, we can then derive total pollution costs that are associated with impacts on emission receptors in (1) country i due to emissions released by the same country, (2) other European countries j (j≠i) and 3) the rest of Europe that are due to emissions released by country i. It is then straightforward to derive the pollution costs -both due to domestic (1) or imported pollution (2) -for any country in Europe. Burden exported from Europe is measured by (3).
The total value of ancillary benefits for the RCP2.6 scenario between 2015 and 2100 is estimated to be equal to €2,578B and about 73% of these benefits have a domestic origin, that is, the local benefits are enjoyed by residents of the European country in which the abatement in local air ambient pollution occurs. The remaining share of ancillary benefits is divided between beneficiaries from European countries (€570B, about 22%) and beneficiaries from rest of the world (€134B, about 5%).
Switching to a country-level analysis, we find that (1) each of the 28 European countries is better off in terms of air quality improvement if RCP2.6 mitigation policy is implemented. In absolute terms, European countries benefit between 2015 and 2100 from a modest 88m € (in Cyprus) to 1,192B € (in Germany). (2) Countries' shares of abatement effort and share of the benefits that are enjoyed by their residents vary significantly, as shown in Figure 7 . Germany generates the largest share of the ancillary benefits, about 44%, followed by the United Kingdom with a contribution of 17%, Italy and Poland both with 6%. These countries also enjoy the largest shares of local benefits. Half of the 28 European countries do not contribute more that 5% to total ancillary benefits, but also do not enjoy more than 5% of the total ancillary benefits. (3) In three European countries -Switzerland, Lithuania and Sweden -the RCP2.6 mitigation scenario results in higher non-GHG emissions than in the Reference case and as a result the generated ancillary benefits are negative in these countries, i.e. RCP2.6 generates damage; thanks to reduced import of emission air quality would be overall also improved.
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Notes: RCP2.6 scenario. Percentage of EU reduction of costs. From Figure 8 it is also possible to infer which countries are net externality producers and which countries are instead net beneficiaries. We define net producers of the ancillary benefits those countries whose share of total benefits generated in Europe is larger than their share of total benefits that are enjoyed by its residents. For example, Bulgaria's contribution to cumulative ancillary benefits due to its non-GHG emission reductions is 0.8% of the total benefits in Europe (€20.7B), while Bulgarians receive only 0.1% of total ancillary benefits in Europe (€2.5B). This implies that Bulgaria contributes more to overall ancillary benefits in Europe than it receives in the RCP2.6 scenario. Such a country can be considered to relatively lose out as a result of the GHG mitigation policy, although we highlight that each country is better off with respect to overall pollution costs in RCP4.5. Estonia, Ireland and Slovenia face the same situation as Bulgaria. Cyprus, Portugal, Finland, Romania, Czech Republic, Greece, Poland and Denmark belong among the net producers as well, but their relative contribution to the overall ancillary benefits is not as large compared to their share of benefits that their residents would enjoy as it is in the first group of net producing countries. The contribution of large countries, such as Germany, France, Italy, Spain, or the United Kingdom, but also of the Netherlands, Slovakia and Hungary is roughly equivalent to their benefits. Belgium, Austria, Latvia, Norway and Luxemburg are the relative winners in Europe since they all receive more ancillary benefits than they generate. 
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The left panel of Figure 9 displays the percentage of ancillary benefits that result from emission reduction in one country which are 'exported' elsewhere. The rest of the benefits have a domestic origin, i.e. they happen due to emission abatement in the same country. The right panel shows 'imported' ancillary benefits as a fraction of total ancillary benefits. These benefits are enjoyed thanks to the emission reductions in other countries. For instance, emission reductions in Italy will mainly benefit the local population and local assets. Only 11% of ancillary benefits are 'exported' to other countries. Cyprus, Italy, Spain or Greece do not benefit much from emission reductions in other countries. Most of the benefits in Luxembourg, Latvia, Norway or Belgium are instead due to the external emissions reductions. In the case of Sweden, Lithuania and Switzerland the share exceeds 100% which describes a situation when 'imported' benefits exceed total benefits. This happens when ancillary benefits due to domestic abatement are negative, that is when the RCP2.6 climate mitigation policy increases local pollution. 
Conclusions and remarks
This paper presents estimates of the air quality ancillary benefits of GHG emission reductions. We consider three climate policy scenarios that achieve three standard radiative forcing levels in 2100: 6.0, 4.5 and 2.6 W/m 2 . These three levels correspond to concentrations of GHG equal to 850, 650, and 490 ppm CO 2 equivalent, which result in global mean temperature increases of 3.7°C, 3.0°C and 2.0°C, respectively. These radiative forcing targets are achieved by introducing a uniform tax on all GHG emissions in the Integrated Assessment Model WITCH, assuming full as well as limited technological flexibility. Our scenarios cover the whole world for the period 2015-2100, however, we assess only ancillary benefits from emissions reductions in electricity generation in Europe.
As emitting GHG becomes more expensive, WITCH projects investment in carbon-free technologies for the energy sector, energy efficiency and R&D to develop carbon-free backstop technologies, substitutes the energy input with other factors and invests in a series of activities to reduce CO 2 emissions from deforestation and other non-CO 2 gases. As a result economic growth is slower in the tax scenarios. In Europe, mitigation policies are usually less costly than in other regions of the world, with cumulated consumption and GDP losses amounting to about 2% and 3% in the RCP2.6 scenario, respectively, if a discount rate based on the endogenous interest rate of WITCH is applied. Compared to the Reference scenario, until 2100 cumulative GHG emissions are reduced by 14% in the RCP6.0, but they are 62% smaller in the RCP4.5 and RCP2.6 leads even to negative cumulative GHG emissions due to the use of biomass with carbon capture and sequestration.
The resulting consumption patterns of fossil fuels in the European electricity sector are used to estimate the physical and economic benefits of pollution reductions on human health and on key assets by implementing the most advanced version of the ExternE methodology with its Impact Pathway Analysis. The ancillary benefits are derived as the difference between pollution costs for the mitigation and the reference scenario, when impacts on human health, crop yield, materials, and biodiversity associated with emissions of PM2.5, PM10, SO 2 , NOx, and NMVOC are considered.
In sum, our estimates of the ancillary benefits of reducing non-GHG polluting emissions in the electricity sector in Europe are in line with estimates in the literature and very close to 33 € per ton of CO 2 abated, the mean value of the benefits reported in the review by Nemet et al. (2010) for developed countries. Specifically, in the RCP2.6 mitigation scenario, we quantify these benefits in Europe at more than €2.5T during 2015-2100, which implies average ancillary benefits of about 21.6 €/t CO 2 eq abated in the European electricity sector. Less strict scenarios generate overall smaller local benefits, but the magnitude of ancillary benefits per ton of CO 2 eq abated is only slightly smaller (€14.4, or €18.3, respectively) than under stricter mitigation. In real terms, without discounting, the ancillary benefits are in the range of €36 to €50 per ton of CO 2 eq abated and the unit value of the benefits for most mitigation scenarios slightly increases over time.
On average, ancillary benefits per ton of CO 2 eq abated in Europe are about 7-times larger than the projected carbon price by WITCH for the RCP6.0 mitigation scenario. As the carbon price increases in the RCP4.5, this ratio declines to 0.5, and it gets as low as 0.06 in the RCP2.6. A lower ratio for larger carbon prices has been frequently documented elsewhere (Grossman et al. 2011 ) and our results are in fact in line with general empirical evidence. For the whole period, cumulative ancillary benefits also exceed cumulative additional cost of electricity generation in Europe, with an exception in the RCP6.0 that actually results in overall cost savings in the power sector.
At country level we find that about 73% of total ancillary benefits attributable to the RCP2.6 mitigation scenario have a domestic origin, while the rest of the benefits are enjoyed in other countries than in the one where the damaging emissions were abated. There are several key findings worth mentioning: first, each of the 28 European countries is better off if RCP2.6 mitigation policy is implemented, although the absolute value of the benefits varies significantly across countries, reflecting their size, primary energy use, and fuel and technology mix to generate electricity. Second, Germany is the key player; it contributes to ancillary benefits by about 44% and receives approximately the same share of total ancillary benefits generated in Europe. Other large European countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy and Poland also considerably contribute to total ancillary benefits. Many other European countries are either small or have cleaner energy mixes and do not contribute much to European-wide ancillary benefits. 14 out of 28 countries generate (and enjoy) less than 5% of total European ancillary benefits. Third, there are relative winners and losers with respect to ancillary benefits in Europe. Large European countries are neutral -they contribute to ancillary benefits as much as they benefit. Hungary, Belgium, Austria, Latvia and Norway benefit more than they contribute to ancillary benefits. Although Switzerland, Lithuania and Sweden generate domestically ancillary damage rather than benefit, overall they win as well due to larger ancillary benefits imported from other European countries.
Technologically constrained RCP4.5 scenarios lead to a higher price of carbon, but the price effect on all emissions is relatively small compared to the emission predictions for the scenario with full flexibility. Overall, limited flexibility in energy efficiency, biomass supply and renewable energy technologies does not yield substantially different results from the ones that we obtain for the mitigation scenario with full flexibility.
The literature suggests that the ancillary benefits of climate mitigation can be very large and are thus policy relevant. Our results confirm previous studies. As pointed out by Burtraw et al. (2003) , not considering ancillary benefits could lead to an incorrect assessment of the net costs of mitigation policies and to an incorrect identification of 'no regrets' levels of GHG mitigation. For instance, Nam et al. (2013) , by using the EPPA5 model, found that if China achieves its SO 2 and NOx emission reduction targets, as proposed in its 12th Five Year Plan, the corresponding carbon-mitigation potential exceeds China's official 17% CO 2 intensity reduction goal. Hence, if these ancillary benefits can be measured in monetary terms, they should be included in the cost calculation of climate policy (Davis et al. 2000) . However some caveats apply.
First, in an ideal world each externality should be addressed using a specific tool. For example, most of the externalities from fossil fuels combustion are additive and should be corrected using taxes on fuel use that reflect the marginal cost of pollution (Heine et al. 2012) . 21 Efficient regulation thus requires the imposition of a penalty on fuel use that is equal to the sum of the marginal cost of each pollutant. Climate policy cannot substitute local pollution policies and vice versa. Unfortunately, this efficient solution is rarely implemented. If local pollution effects are not internalized, a carbon tax calibrated to reflect the marginal cost of carbon emissions has positive spillovers. If climate policy is not implemented taxes aimed at reducing local pollution may have a positive global spillover if the fuel mix shifts towards cleaner fuels. If local pollution is reduced using end-of-pipe technologies carbon emissions may remain constant or may increase due to efficiency losses This externality should be included in the cost calculations of local pollution policies.
Second, the existence of ancillary benefits should not be a reason for increasing the carbon tax or to make climate regulation more stringent. The goal of carbon taxes is to reduce the climate externality and the carbon price should be set to reflect the social cost of carbon. If climate policy also improves air quality, then air quality policy can be less stringent than it would be if climate policy was not implemented. This benefit of GHG mitigation should not be neglected but the social cost of carbon does not change.
Finally, we appreciate Ian Parry 's et al. (2014) suggestion to "understand how much carbon emissions reduction is in the self-interest of countries" and to derive nationally efficient carbon prices. We are however more cautious than to call for "an approach that builds on national self-interest and spurs a race to the top in low-carbon energy solutions" (Parry 2014.) . It is true that policies regulating local damage are more acceptable by the public than policies which have local costs but global benefits far in the future. The focus on local benefits may increase the political acceptability of carbon taxes. However, it remains unclear what would happen if the carbon tax had to increase above the level that is deemed optimal to reduce local pollution. We find that the +2°C compatible scenario has a carbon price that is always much higher than what would be justified by local benefits alone. Although we do not account for all possible ancillary benefits, it seems plausible to assume that pursuing local benefits alone will not keep the increase of global mean temperature below +2°C.
There are several limitations in our modelling approach that may require further research.
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First, since the quantification of ancillary benefits is based on a soft-link of WITCH global model and ExternE's Impact Pathway Approach, there is no optimal joint management of local and global externalities. Within the very recent LIMITS project, air quality model has been made endogenous in WITCH model, which will allow later analysing the joint management of the two externalities.
Second, we use WITCH to determine the economic and technological impacts at global level, while the non-GHG impacts and ancillary benefits are quantified for Europe and only from non-GHG emission abatement in electricity sector. Our assessment is hence not complete.
Third, we are interested in finding out the distribution across European countries of the pollution costs and of the ancillary benefits of climate change mitigation policy. The WITCH model provides energy scenarios for two large blocs in Europe: Western and Eastern Europe. We therefore build energy scenarios for 28 European countries assuming that each country's share of total energy use in the European bloc remains constant over time and under alternative climate mitigation policies. In reality, fuel-mix may change differently across countries in the bloc. Assuming that each country will mimic others within the bloc is quite a reasonable assumption, especially in the long run.
Fourth, ancillary benefits are determined by emission-fuel coefficients that are derived from the EMEP EEA air pollutant emission inventory guidebook (EMEP/EEA 2013). More sources may provide a wide range of the emission-fuel coefficients that might be used in a sensitivity analysis to estimate uncertainty in our estimate of ancillary benefits. The emission factors of fuels also remain constant over the entire period that actually implies no improvement in the efficacy of the end-of-pipe non-GHG abatement technologies. Incorporating dynamic improvement in the abatement efficacy would significantly improve our calculations.
We leave all these possible extensions to future research.
